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At least in my country there is some cause for alarm. Per capita expenditures on medical care have risen from roughly 200 dollars a year in 1965to over 900 dollars a year in 1979.Total national outlay for medical care has risen from 39 billions in 1965to over 200 billions this year. Whereas we devoted only 6% of our gross national product to medical care in 1965, we now devote almost 10%.
And despite these enormous upward surges of costs and expenditures, in a comparable period we suffered an 8% increase in work days lost due to illness; a 6% increase in school days lost due to illness; a 27% increase in bed disability days. While we spend more on medical care than most nations, five nations do better in preventing deaths from cancer; ten nations have a lower death rate from circulatory diseases; 16 nations do a better job of keeping infants alive during their first year, and 17 nations have a higher level of life expectancy.
It is true that when I accepted the invitation to give this Lecture it never occurred to me that I would on June 5th find myself in the middle of a controversy between my President and Senator Kennedy on national health policy. It never dawned on me that both of America's national newsmagazines would last week have made the cost of health, or rather the cost of medical care, the feature of their cover stories. Under such circumstances diplomacy would indeed counsel restraint on the President's representative speaking in a foreign land. To the humility which should be the lot of the dilettante among professionals is now added the inhibition of my current calling.
Diplomatic indirection cannot cover up the vast gulf of my ignorance. I cannot say where I stand because I do not know. I do not know enough to have convictions about, let alone prescribe for, any nation's health policy. Happily that is not my intention. My purpose is, rather, to explore and speculate about the medical economy as just one example among many of the need to find a third way, something more adequate than the free market; something more satisfactory than government direction.
It occurred to me some time ago that we grandsons of the nineteenth century have been too long hung up on the horns of a classic dilemma. Since the free market is imperfect, the State should take over. Or, since the State makes a dreadful mess of it, we better rely on the free market. In fact, increasingly the work of the world goes on in between. But still the only 'models' we have are the models of capitalism and the models of socialism.
I suppose my educated instinct is that of the common law: anti-model. The common-law tradition tends to look for a solution by attending to the practicalities of the problem at hand rather than expecting revelation from some all-embracing concept, or 'model'.
I would start with two propositions. First, if giving free reign to private acquisitiveness is not serving the public interest, see if there is a way to turn private cupidity to public purpose before having the government take over. Second, in trying to channel private self-interest in the public interest, use the carrot rather than the stick. Incentive is so much more constructive than prohibition.
The question with which I start is: in the medical economy, is it possible that we might devise some regime which is better than the offering of service for a fee by private practitioners on the one hand or the assumption of total responsibility by the State for health care on the other? If the free market has failed can we perhaps create an artificial market to serve the public interest? If public ownership or public regulation has failed can we perhaps use public financing to create by incentive what we cannot achieve by public management or regulation? This is a very large question in a great many fields, not just medicine. Maybe it is the question for any society which strives to remain or become as voluntary as possible for all its members. On the one hand, a voluntary society cannot tolerate the deprivation and discrimination which untrammelled private power would impose ifleft wholly to itself. On the other, a society which would be voluntary cannot abide official power to push other people around. Yet such power seems invited by the ever-expanding reach and grasp of government. The medical economy may be an area worth probing to see if there is a third way: the use of the powers of government, not to take over the direction of activity but to create arrangements with built-in incentives designed to achieve the public purpose.
The fact is that modem societies do not want the laws of supply and demand to decide who receives medical care. Even the United States is at last accepting that access to adequate medical care is a: right. The 'entitlement State' assumes this responsibility.
If the only problem with the operation of the medical market were the inequitable distribution of income, surely we could solve that by subsidizing the poor through vouchers for medical expenses or some form of reimbursement to make the poor richer for this particular purpose. Then let them shop around to find the best care at the lowest cost.
The trouble with this notion is that in my country at least the bills are usually paid, not by the patient but by his insurance company, or by his employer acting as an insurer. The costs of care are so high that the patient -or his employer -is glad to pay a premium for protection against the evil day. The evil days are few enough for the population as a whole, so that the premiums which the potential patients are willing to pay (or helped by the government to pay) more than cover the costs of the medical care which turns out to be needed. The fear of the cost of illness and the calculation of the actuarial mind can easily be brought into agreement on an ample premium. It is even easier if by collective bargaining you can persuade your employer to pay the entire premium for you. One way or another about 95% of all hospital costs in the United States are in fact paid by insurers, and almost half of all doctor's bills are paid either by insurers or by the government under Medicare and Medicaid.
Obviously if someone else is paying the bills there is scarcely any incentive to shop around for the lowest doctor's fees or hospital charges. If this were the only problem, surely ingenuity might devise ways of giving the patient an interest in economizing on medical care, just as though his own money were at stake. Medicare requires the patient to carry a certain percentage of the bills out of his own pocket. The patient could be allowed to redeem his voucher for cash to the extent it was not spent.
Even if by some such fanciful scheme, however, the financial self-interest of the patient could be restored, I doubt very much whether the market would do the job we normally expect of it, to keep the pressure on suppliers to lower their costs lest they lose their customer to a competitor.
The trouble is that the patient, when he thinks something is wrong with him, is not an economic man. He is a fearful, ignorant, helpless, miserable creature. He does want health, almost at any price. He is not looking for what the economists call a 'provider', He is looking for professional judgment. He cannot begin to compare professional capacity objectively.
Next to the quality of professional judgment, the patient wants to feel that the person treating him has no thought other than how best to restore his health. He wants no second best. He certainly does not want his needs to be weighed against the claims of other patients. The patient, in short, is looking for a trustee, not a 'provider', So too on the physician's side. He is not looking over his shoulder at the costs and quality offered by competing 'providers' when he begins his diagnosis. His judgment about what to prescribe is not a function of examining competitors' 'offers' in terms of quality or price. His single motivation is, or should be, how best to discharge his trust as effectively as possible. He too wants to preserve or restore health at almost any price. Under the American system as it stands, relying on insurance to cover the charges of individual practitioners who set their own fees, it is not hard to see why both patient and doctor will err on the side of doing more rather than less. There is a powerful temptation for the patient to seek care he does not need and for the physician to provide it. Market forces cannot be expected to keep pressure on costs.
Generally patients do not pay their medical bills, they pay their premiums whether they are sick or well, so when consultation and treatment are resorted to they are already paid for. The patient is not a consumer, he is a beneficiary. The doctor is not a supplier, he is a trustee. Both within broad limits do want health at any price.
The natural reaction to exorbitant and ever rising costs unrestrained by market forces is regulation. Insurance companies would seem to have a financial self-interest in discouraging unnecessary care and preventing wasteful practices and excessive charges. And so they have. This they pursue through endless studies, provision of technical managerial advice, assistance in the measurement ofhospital productivity. But when it comes to conditioning reimbursement on proof that care was necessary or provided in an efficient manner, insurers have not been able to do much better than insist that care and the charges for it should meet some normal and acceptable standard. In practice this can do no more than set a standard of minimal responsibility.
With the introduction of the Federal Government as a source of financing, pressure has mounted for some review of the appropriateness of the care whose cost was met by the government. Professional Standards Review Organizations were established for this purpose. Again, however, such review will give a black mark only to the case ofextreme irresponsibility.
If you move to direct cost regulation, whether of hospital costs or physicians' individual charges, as in the case of all regulation it may be necessary to be arbitrary -or at least uniform -in order to be fair. Yet uniformity inevitably fails to take into account the variety of costs which are at least plausibly relevant to the quality of service.
If the state seeks to solve the problem of cost escalation by taking over direct responsibility for the entire medical economy, these problems are translated into management, personnel and budget decisions; but the problems are not markedly different from those of direct regulation of private activity by a government agency.
Even if it were appropriate for me to express a judgment about Britain's national health service I would not be qualified to do so. On the one hand I and my fellow countrymen are admiring to the point of envy of any society which can truly say that it has achieved nondiscriminatory access to health care for all its citizens. Rationing by queue may be frustrating. And the cash limits on current expenditures and the borrowing limits on capital expenditures may lead to run down and obsolescent facilities. Nevertheless, the widespread sense of fairness in the society on matters of health and illness, even life and death, is and should be a mark of national pride. On the other hand, as in the case of direct regulation of costs and charges, it is almost inevitable that compensation should be regulated without regard to the infinite variety of the time, attention and anguished moral responsibility which will fall so unevenly among practitioners. Perhaps my favourite witness on this matter is not entirely objective, but I learned more from Enoch Powell's book, 'Medicine and Politics', than from any other I have read on the subject: 'The doctor cannot build up a practice and a reputation that enables him to reap the reward of his effortseither in incomeor in satisfaction. Paradoxically, the better he does his work, the worse offhe is. The money he spends on improvinghis premises, providinghimselfwith modem equipment, payingfor efficient reception, clerical and other administrative staff, will not increase his earnings by one penny. On the contrary, the cost willcomeout of an incomethat wouldhave been undiminishedifhe had spent on none of these things. If he restricts his list to the number of patients he can treat properly and conscientiously, and devotesto consultationthe amount of time and care he considersto be required, he cannot recoup himself, as under the old combinationof private enterprise with rough-and-ready charity, by"soaking the rich". He will merelyend up with a lowerincomethan his lessable or scrupulous fellows, with the added chagrin of knowing that the money he forgoes will be redistributed among them. The essence of the private enterprise system, competition for gain, has been gouged out of family doctoring, while living in the empty shell.' Just as the market 'failed' because the physician-patient relationship is not one of a seller and a buyer bargaining for each other; so too cost regulation 'fails' because it cannot fairly evaluate the necessity and the quality of the care provided and therefore cannot fairly determine what its cost should be.
Is there any way out of this expensive triangle of patient, physician, and government as underwriter? One path of promise would be to have the patient make his medical choice when he is still thinking rationally as an economic manthat is, before he becomes a patient. Instead of paying his premium and being free to spend his insurance payments wherever he wants, ask him to pay a fee for access to comprehensive care offered by a designated group of physicians. If there are several groups offering their plans for prepaid comprehensive care and there is competition not only in reputation but in the level of fee to be paid, the market might begin to operate.
Recent developments with prepaid comprehensive care offered by a group of salaried doctors have shown promise of startling economies. While experience is limited, and control groups are hard to define in terms of precise comparability, evidence is accumulating that costs are lower for prepaid group plans than for insured fee for service. I quote from Enthoven (1978) : 'Luft reviewed and analyzed the many comparison studies done since 1950 and concluded that the cost reduction was on the order of 10 to 40 per cent. The cost savings are mainly attributable to much lower hospitalization rates, and to greater economy and efficiency of operation. '
Of course there is a great variety of prepaid group practice. Although the government has sought to facilitate the formation of such Health Maintenance Organizations (HMO), as the legislation calls them, interestingly enough the encouragement comes at a heavy price of red tape. Those groups who have prospered most have developed on their own, without government assistance. Some have been sponsored by employers. This was the origin of the Kaiser-Permanente program; since proliferated under the Kaiser Hospitals and Health Plan. Labor Unions also have become sponsors of so-called HMOs. More recently major universities, especially those with medical centres and affiliated hospitals, have developed comprehensive prepaid health plans.
Competition has already brought new plans into being, often to defend traditional practice against the group invader. In an effort to preserve the freedom to charge fees for service rather than to be compensated by a flat salary, some doctors have sought to organize plans where the organization is billed and ceilings on fees are accepted. If fees do not cover costs, member doctors may accept a pro-rata reduction in fees.
What is the role of government in all this welter of experimentation? The approach which I urge is the use of government subsidy to encourage the creation of an artificial market for competition among prepaid comprehensive care plans. Where competition fails at the point of treatment, let it be created at the point of choice of plan, before the consumer becomes a patient. This could be done by affording more favourable tax treatment for fees paid in advance for comprehensive health care by a designated group than for buying insurance for the payment of medical bills charged on a fee-for-service basis. Then perhaps competition might begin to do its job of keeping the pressure on to offer more and better care for fewer dollars expended. Also, Government could, if it so desired, sharpen the incentives for both patients and doctors.
Even for those whose prepaid fees were subsidized because they could not afford to payout of their own pocket, an economic self-interest in looking for the most for the least would be whetted if he were permitted to redeem for cash any part of his voucher not expended because of selection of a plan whose charges were below the face value of the voucher. For those well enough off to be paying income tax, a standard tax credit could be provided. Again there would be an incentive to spend as little as possible.
In order to encourage the patient not to resort to unnecessary care it might be further provided that to those whose costs of actual annual care fell below the group average, a rebate would be given, or perhaps a credit against next year's fee.
On the physician's side, as in the Kaiser Plan, the participating doctors could be partners, sharing the risks of loss, sharing the benefits of surplus. Since they have an interest in being fully utilized, presumably they will set their fee as low as possible consistently with a fair return in order to compete favourably with other groups or with physicians charging on a feefor-service basis. For the same reason they have a large stake in their reputation for effective care. At the same time the partnership interest gives them an incentive to improve efficiency of operation and avoid unnecessary procedures and hospital admissions.
Some might worry that patients might be dissuaded from seeking the care they needed just in order to settle for a lower fee or to qualify for a rebate. Apart from the somewhat callous consolation that it would be their own fault, I think I have enough confidence in the hypochondria in all mankind to feel that the trade-off between cash and health will give sufficient weight to health.
On the doctors' side there might be a somewhat cynical worry that partners who have a stake in maximizing earnings by reducing outlays against an income of fixed fees would be tempted to take short cuts or to short-change their patients by failing to prescribe expensive care even when it was needed. Ultimately I think I have sufficient faith in the trusteeship motivation, buttressed in this case by long-run self-interest in group as well as individual reputation.
In the search for constructive government responses to market failure other than government regulation or government management, I am inclined to believe that the American contribution will not be any single sweeping answer, but a multiplicity of groping probes, experiments, novel structures and arrangements. The public outcry about excessive rises in medical costs is so great that even the American Medical Association and the American Hospital Association have become much more hospitable to new forms of practice and its financing than they would have been even a few years ago. Out of this welter of development will, I am sure, emerge not an answer but clues to better answers. We dare not attempt a monolithic solution. It would not work. It would not command that disciplined support which a smaller, more homogeneous society can reasonably expect. Our size, our decentralization, our privilege of tens of hundreds of public and private academic institutions focusing on professional and operational problems as well as purely academic and scientific problems, assure a churning of new ideas worthy of experimental test.
. By groping pragmatically we may not stumble upon a new and more adequate Ideology to compete with either Adam Smith or Karl Marx. But we may find that there are solutions which allow us to keep society more voluntary than it would be under either the rule of the unfettered market or the rule of the all-pervasive State.
